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Entrepreneurial activity is presumed to generate important spillovers, potentially justifying tax
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practice?  We first show theoretically that taxes can affect the incentives to be an entrepreneur due simply
to differences in tax rates on business vs. wage and salary income, due to differences in the tax treatment
of losses vs. profits through a progressive rate structure and through the option to incorporate, and due
to risk-sharing with the government.  We then provide empirical evidence using U.S. individual tax return
data that these aspects of the tax law have had large effects on actual behavior.
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Entrepreneurial activity is commonly viewed to be a key ingredient generating economic
growth. New ﬁrms try out not only new products and new technologies, but also new
internal forms of organization or even merely a new location. When new approaches
succeed, other ﬁrms can imitate, leading to improvements generally in productivity. The
“new growth” literature suggests that spillovers of information such as from entrepreneurial
activity play an important role in explaining economic growth. Given such spillovers,
market incentives alone can generate too little entrepreneurial activity.
Given these positive spillovers generated by entrepreneurial activity, there are clear
reasons to try to subsidize such activity through the taxsystem. The objective of this
paper is to assess to what degree the taxsystem aﬀects the amount of entrepreneurial
activity, both theoretically and empirically.
The stylized view we adopt in this paper is that entrepreneurial activity consists pri-
marily of start-up ﬁrms pursuing highly risky projects. These new ﬁrms will normally
enter as noncorporate ﬁrms, and then later incorporate if successful.1 The objective of the
paper is then to explore the degree to which the tax system has aﬀected the amount of
risk-taking observed among noncorporate (so presumably recent start-up) ﬁrms.
There are a variety of possible mechanisms through which the taxsystem can aﬀect
an individual’s incentives to undertake risky projects. For one, small business owners can
much more easily underreport their taxable income than can wage and salary earners. The
higher are taxrates, the stronger the incentive to open up a business as a means to avoid
taxes.
Another reason why high marginal taxrates may encourage risk-taking was originally
described in Domar and Musgrave (1944).2 While high taxrates may discourage eﬀort
We would like to thank Bill Gentry, Don Bruce, and participants in seminars at the NBER Summer
Institute, Berkeley, Stanford, and University of Colorado at Boulder for comments on an earlier draft.
1 As seen below, this lifecycle pattern for a ﬁrm is implied by the incentives created by the tax law.
2 For a more recent exploration of the eﬀects of a proportional tax on risk-taking, see Sinn (1996). Bird
1and investment in the economy as a whole, Domar and Musgrave argue that high taxrates
make risky projects relatively more attractive. High taxrates mean that substantial risk
is transferred to the government through random taxpayments. If adverse selection in
ﬁnancial markets makes risk-sharing with outside investors diﬃcult, then the taxsystem
provides an alternative means to share risk that is free from these adverse selection prob-
lems.3 With more risk sharing available, an entrepreneur’s risk premium will be lower,
and risk taking should be greater.
Gentry and Hubbard (2000) emphasize a diﬀerent eﬀect of the taxsystem on risk-taking
that arises even if investors are risk-neutral. If the marginal taxrate under the personal
income taxis an increasing function of tax able income, then entrepreneurs are able to
save little in taxes on any losses they incur but can owe substantial taxes on any proﬁts.
The more progressive the taxschedule, therefore, the more risk-taking lowers the ex pected
after-taxreturn from the project. As a result, a progressive rate schedule discourages
risk-taking.4
An important omission from this last argument is the option ﬁrms always have to
avoid high personal taxrates by incorporating. This option is valuable to the ex tent that
personal income is taxed at a higher rate than corporate income.5 In recent years in the
U.S., the corporate taxrate for a small ﬁrm could be as low as 15%, which is below the
marginal personal (plus payroll) taxrate faced by eﬀectively all individuals. As a result,
a ﬁrm generating taxlosses will prefer to be noncorporate so that the entrepreneur can
(2001) provides some empirical evidence, using a cross-country panel data set, that countries with higher
tax rates have more variable incomes, consistent with this hypothesis.
3 However, if ﬁnancial markets succeed in allocating eﬃciently across investors the risk embodied in ﬁrm
shares, Gordon (1985) showed that a proportional tax does not aﬀect the relative attractiveness of risky
vs. less risky projects.
4 There have also been several papers examining taxes and self-employment rates that use a more
reduced form approach. Recent examples include Bruce (2000), Schuetze (2000), and Fairlie and Meyer
(2000). The ﬁrst two papers ﬁnd that higher marginal income tax rates encourage self-employment, while
the third ﬁnds no clear eﬀects of taxes.
5 For an early recognition of this point, see Feldstein and Slemrod (1980). Gordon and Slemrod (forth-
coming) provide empirical evidence on the importance of income shifting between the personal and the
corporate tax bases. Gordon (1998) points out more explicitly the potential resulting subsidy to risk-taking,
and discusses under what conditions this subsidy would generate an eﬃciency gain.
2deduct these losses against other personal income, saving on personal income taxes. When
and if the ﬁrm generates proﬁts, in contrast, for taxpurposes the entrepreneur will prefer
to incorporate so that these proﬁts are taxed at the lower corporate tax rate.6 This option
to choose the organizational form expost 7 based on the outcome provides a net subsidy
to risk-taking. The higher are personal relative to corporate taxrates, the larger is the
subsidy arising from this option. As with any option, this option to incorporate is more
valuable the greater the risk faced by the entrepreneur. In itself, therefore, this option
subsidizes risk-taking. Section 1 develops these various hypotheses in more detail.
The size of corporate vs. personal taxrates in the U.S. has varied substantially over
time, and the changes have diﬀered substantially by income bracket, making it feasible
to test empirically for the eﬀects of these various taxeﬀects on business activity. We
make use of Statistics of Income Tax Return data to test empirically for each of the above
eﬀects of the taxlaw on the amount of entrepreneurial activity. Section 2 describes our
estimation strategy, while results are reported in section 3. Section 4 summarizes the
forecasted sensitivity of entrepreneurial activity to taxpolicy, while section 5 provides a
brief set of conclusions.
1. Theory
The main objective in developing the theory is to assess the impact of taxes on the
amount of risk-taking in small ﬁrms. Risk-taking depends not only on the riskiness of any
given business project undertaken by an individual (the standard deviation per dollar of
expected income), but also on the average scale of the project (the number of dollars of
expected income), as well as on the number of individuals who engage in at least some
business activity. In addition, the chosen scale of the project will depend on how much
6 In principle, if the corporate income is taxed at a rate above that due on the individual’s personal
income, then there is an incentive to have a project owned by a corporation while it generates tax losses
and then spun oﬀ to a noncorporate (e.g. sub-chapter S) ﬁrm when it generates proﬁts. For this to work,
given the no-loss-oﬀset provisions under the corporate tax, a loss-making project must be owned by a
corporation generating proﬁts from other activities.
7 By law, ﬁrms face the constraint that they cannot change their form of organization more than once
every ﬁve years. We ignore this constraint, on the presumption that the key uncertainty is simply whether
and when the ﬁrm will become proﬁtable.
3of the entrepreneur’s own time and savings are invested in the project, as well as on how
many other people she hires and how much capital she obtains from outside investors. Our
model is designed to capture how taxes aﬀect each of these decisions.
Assume that a particular individual starts with available hours of H and available
assets of A.8 This individual can divide her time between a salaried position, paying w
per hour before tax, and an entrepreneurial project. Let He denote the time spent as an
employee, and Hp the time spent on the entrepreneurial project, where He + Hp = H.
If this individual works Hp hours in self-employed (noncorporate) activities, we assume
that the resulting pretaxincome π(˜  )e q u a l s
π(˜  ) ≡ f(awHp,L,K;s)(1+ s˜  ) − wmL,
where a is an entrepreneurial ability parameter (varying by individual), L equals the
number of workers hired at market wage wm,9 K is the amount of own and borrowed
funds invested in the ﬁrm,10 and ˜   is distributed N(0,1). Here, s denotes the standard
deviation of the random variable, which enters the production function directly to capture
the higher expected proﬁts on more risky projects available in equilibrium in the market.
In addition to income from entrepreneurial activity and salaried employment, the in-
dividual receives income r(A − K)o na n ya s s e t sn o ti n v e s t e di nt h eﬁ r m ,w h e r er is the
market interest rate.11 In addition, let Y denote any other income, e.g. spouse’s income.
8 We chose not to model the choice of overall savings or labor eﬀort, focusing instead on how diﬀerences in
tax treatment aﬀect the division of these factors between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial activities.
9 We make the implicit assumption here that workers do not share in the ﬁrm’s risk, being insured by
the entrepreneur. This can arise not only due to sharp diﬀerences in the relative costs of risk-bearing
for workers vs. the entrepreneur, but also due to “lemons” problems, arising when workers fear that
pessimistic entrepreneurs will oﬀer such contracts more readily.
10 Technically, we assume that the individual rather than the ﬁrm borrows. (If instead ﬁrms borrow,
the eﬀects on the analysis are minor, leading to ﬁrst-order conditions below of the form of equation (3)
vs. equation (2).) One further assumption is that the individual cannot sell equity in her ﬁrm to outside
(venture capital) investors, due to lemons’ problems. The only real issue is whether the extent of this
venture capital ﬁnancing varies over time, with changes in the tax incentives faced by venture capitalists.
Implicitly, we will control for possible changing incentives in the empirical work through use of time
dummies.
11 While we allow explicitly only for investments in bonds, all investments in equilibrium yield a certainty-
equivalent after-tax rate of return equal to that on bonds.
4Total pre-taxincome, denoted by ˜ I, therefore equals12
˜ I ≡ Y + wHe + r(A − K)+π(˜  ).
Of course, the nature of the taxlaw is key in analyzing individual incentives. Let Tp(.)
represent the personal taxschedule, 13 while τ(.) represents the corporate taxschedule
(including any personal taxes owed on dividend or capital gains income). Wage income
is always subject to personal income taxes. Income from self-employment can be divided
ﬂexibly between the corporate and the personal tax schedules, so that the individual can
classify any amount C of business income as corporate, as long as 0 ≤ C ≤ π(˜  ) if the ﬁrm
has proﬁts, and π(˜  ) ≤ C ≤ 0 if the ﬁrm has losses.14
Shifting C to the corporate sector not only aﬀects taxpayments, but may also create
nontaxbeneﬁts (or costs). 15 Denote these beneﬁts by θ|C|.16 In choosing this functional
form, our intent is simply to assume that the nontaxbeneﬁts/costs are proportional to
the scale of the ﬁrm, where ﬁrms are presumed to be large if they have either large proﬁts
or large losses. These nontaxbeneﬁts then make any corporate proﬁts larger, and any
corporate losses smaller, than they would have been otherwise.
Given U.S. taxprovisions, we assume that losses are deductible from other income
12 For simplicity, we ignore here the possibility of bankruptcy, and the resulting risk-sharing with outside
creditors. As with risk-sharing through the tax system, risk-sharing through the bankruptcy law could in
principle make entrepreneurship more attractive. For evidence on this, see White and Fan (2000), who
ﬁnd that self-employment is more common in U.S. states that have more generous bankruptcy provisions.
13 For simplicity of exposition, we ignore payroll taxes (and any oﬀsetting pension beneﬁts) here, even
though they are taken into account in the empirical work.
14 These constraints, limiting the extent of income shifting between the corporate and personal tax bases,
are a simple but rather ad hoc way to derive an equilibrium allocation of income between the two tax
bases. In practice, ﬁrms are often able to do better, e.g. proﬁtable corporations can rent their building
or lease their equipment from a noncorporate partnership that generates tax losses on its investments,
leading to C>π (˜  ). Such tax shelter activity will show up in the data as noncorporate losses among those
in the top personal tax brackets, and should be more extensive the larger the diﬀerence between the top
personal tax rate and corporate rates.
15 For example, access to both limited liability and public trading of shares should make it easier and
cheaper for corporations to raise funds from outside investors.
16 The empirical evidence reported in Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) suggests that the parameter θ
is positive in all industries except ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate.
5under the personal taxbut that corporate losses do not result in any taxrefunds. 17 If the
entrepreneurial project remains entirely noncorporate, the individual’s personal income tax
payments equal Tp(˜ I).18 If instead the ﬁrm reports some corporate income, the combined
personal plus corporate taxliabilities, minus the nontaxbeneﬁts from incorporation, equal
Tp(˜ I−C)+τ(C+θ|C|)−θ|C|.19 The entrepreneur will choose C to minimize this expression,
subject to the constraint that sign(C)=sign(π(˜  )−C). It quickly follows that a proﬁtable
ﬁrm will report nonzero corporate income as long as τ  < [T 
p(˜ I)+θ]/(1+θ), while a loss-
making ﬁrm will report nonzero corporate income only if θ>T  
p(˜ I). In general, when
the individual can divide business but not other income optimally between the corporate
and the personal taxschedules, we can ex press the individual’s taxpayments minus any
nontaxbeneﬁts from incorporating by some function T[Y + wHe + r(A − K),π(˜  )]. We
will refer to T as the “eﬀective” taxpayments.
Because only business income can be shifted, we know that T1 ≥ T2,w h e r eT1 ≡ ∂T/∂Y
and T2 ≡ ∂T/∂π. Since only business income can be reclassiﬁed as corporate, the inequality
will be strict whenever the individual would want to shift more than all of her business
proﬁts to the corporate sector, implying that τ  < [T 
p(˜ I − ˜ π)+θ]/(1+θ), or whenever she
reports corporate losses and T 
p(˜ I) >θ . For purposes of discussion, we will assume that
T1 >T 2 over some nonnegligible range of ˜  ’s.
Figure 1 provides an example, based on the 1993 tax code, for an individual with
expected pretax income of $150,000. This income is assumed to consist of $30,000 in
expected business income and $120,000 in other income. After-tax income is graphed if
the ﬁrm is always corporate vs. always noncorporate.20 In fact, the entrepreneur will
17 We ignore therefore the potential beneﬁts from tax-loss carryforwards, on the grounds that the failure
rate of new start-ups is too high to make this option attractive. In addition, we ignore the possibility of a
corporation with tax losses merging with a ﬁrm with taxable proﬁts, so implicitly assume that real costs
of such a merger outweigh any tax beneﬁts.
18 For simplicity, we ignore tax vs. economic depreciation, and any other statutory diﬀerences between
taxable and true proﬁts. These diﬀerences apply to all real investments, whereas our focus is on the degree
to which real investments occur in entrepreneurial projects.
19 We assume here that the nontax beneﬁts from incorporation are reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s taxable proﬁts.
20 In this graph, we assumed that θ = .12, consistent with the empirical estimates reported below.
6choose expost which form is best depending on which yields the highest after-taxincome.
In this case, the ﬁrm will be corporate if proﬁts are positive, and noncorporate otherwise.
Given the taxcode, the individual chooses the control variables He, Hp, L, K,a n ds
to maximize expected utility, subject to the constraint that Hp +He = H. For simplicity,
assume that utility depends on just the mean and the variance of income,21 so that the
individual maximizes EU(˜ IN)=E ( ˜ IN) − .5(β/wH)var(˜ IN), where ˜ IN ≡ ˜ I − T equals
after-taxincome, and β is a taste parameter measuring the cost of risk-bearing.22 The
one decision we assume can be made expost, once ˜  is observed, is whether or not to
incorporate. All other decisions are made exante.





T[Y + wHe + r(A − K),π(˜  )]φd˜  
where φ is the density function for ˜  . Expected after-tax income equals
E(˜ IN)=Y + wHe + r(A − K)+E π(˜  ) − ¯ T.
The variance of after-taxincome equals E( ˜ IN − E(˜ IN))2 ≡ E(sf˜   − T + ¯ T)2.23























21 As a result, we assume no direct eﬀect on utility from the choice to enter entrepreneurial activity,
holding certainty-equivalent income ﬁxed. This is in contrast to Carroll et al (2000), who introduce
tastes per se for being an entrepreneur, and assume an income elasticity of greater than one for being
an entrepreneur. In their setting, because of these tastes, a higher uniform tax rate can discourage
entrepreneurial activity. While they provide supporting evidence that the income of sole proprietorships
went up following the cuts in personal tax rates enacted in 1986, this evidence can also be explained by the
drop in personal tax rates relative to the corporate tax rate, so does not require introducing diﬀerential
tastes for the two types of jobs.
22 We chose this functional form, which implies constant absolute risk aversion (ignoring the wH dividing
β), in order to simplify the derivations. However, we divided β by the individual’s potential labor income
wH in order to approximate the results that would arise under constant relative risk aversion.
23 We (along with Domar and Musgrave) make the simplifying assumption that the random return to
each entrepreneurial project is statistically independent from that on other projects, being aﬀected solely
by technological uncertainty, so that there is no risk in aggregate tax revenue. As a result, there is no extra
term in ˜ I capturing the individual’s share of the risk in aggregate tax revenue. Given these assumptions,
if the entrepreneur could diversify all her risks through the market, then ˜ I would no longer be risky, and




















measure the marginal utility of receiving the random amounts T1 or T2. Given the mean-
variance utility function, this marginal utility equals the expected value minus the required
risk premium, where the risk premium takes the standard form of the covariance of the
payments with expost after-taxincome.
If the individual chooses not to engage in any entrepreneurial activity, e.g. due to low
entrepreneurial ability a, then the inequality in equation (1) will be strict. In general, this
equation forecasts that all individuals above some ability level a∗ will engage in at least
some entrepreneurial activity. The higher the value of the expression inside the brackets,
capturing the eﬀects of the taxlaw, the lower the value of a∗ at which an individual is just
indiﬀerent to engaging in entrepreneurial activity, and so the higher the probability that
an individual with wage w (but unobserved a) will be an entrepreneur.
To understand the role of taxes in this equation, consider ﬁrst how taxes would enter
if the taxsystem were proportional, so that T1 = T2 = t for some ﬁxed value t that does
not depend on ˜  .24 Under a proportional structure, (Te
1 − Te
2)/(1 − Te
1) = 0. In addition,
E(˜  T2)=tE˜   = 0. All the explicit tax terms therefore drop out of equation (1). However,
˜ IN − E(˜ IN)=( 1− t)sf˜  , so that the risk premium term is smaller the higher the tax
rate t. This is the Domar-Musgrave eﬀect. In particular, with a proportional taxrate t,
taxes would reduce the variance of business income in proportion to (1 − t)2, but reduce
expected income only in proportion to (1 − t), on net making risky activities relatively
more attractive.25
With a nonproportional taxsystem, arising from a corporate rate diﬀering from per-
sonal taxrates as well as from a progressive income taxschedule, tax es aﬀect the allocation
24 Note that such a proportional system requires not only a proportional personal tax schedule but also
a corporate tax rate equal to the personal tax rate.
25 Intuitively, the tax system allows entrepreneurs to diversity t percent of their risks with the rest of the
population, to that extent lowering the net costs of risk bearing.
8of labor in more complicated ways. To begin with, we see from the ﬁrst term in equation
(1) that entrepreneurial activity is encouraged to the degree that Te
2 <T e
1.T h i st e r mc a p -
tures the beneﬁts from being able to shift business but not wage income from the personal
to the corporate taxschedule, so we will refer to it as the “income-shifting” eﬀect.
Taxes continue to aﬀect the size of the second (risk-premium) term, in a form closely
analogous to what happens with a proportional taxsystem. However, the details are
messier. For example, with a nonlinear tax structure, the risk from extra entrepreneurial
activity depends on the marginal eﬀective taxrate, while the size of ˜ IN depends on the
average eﬀective taxrate.
The ﬁnal term, E(˜  T2), measures the expected tax payments on the random return ˜  .
Under a proportional tax, this term equals zero. If losses were deductible subject to a
high personal taxrate while proﬁts are tax ed at a lower corporate taxrate, then ex pected
taxpayments on ˜   will be negative, making entrepreneurial activity more attractive. Con-
versely, if we ignore the option to incorporate, so that income is subject to a progressive
personal tax, then this term is necessarily positive, penalizing entrepreneurial activity.26
As a result, this term can be negative for richer entrepreneurs, lowering the cost of un-
dertaking more risk, but will normally be positive for entrepreneurs in lower personal tax
brackets. In Figure 1, this term will be negative if the upper envelope of the after-tax
income schedules is predominantly convexover the relevant range, whereas this term will
be positive if the after-taxincome schedule is predominantly concave.
On net, we ﬁnd that higher personal taxrates should lead entrepreneurial time to in-
crease, given the resulting change in the denominator in all three terms in equation (1),
given the increase in Te
1 − Te
2 in the numerator of the ﬁrst term (since corporate income
escapes the increased taxrate), given the increased risk-sharing with the government cap-
tured by the numerator of the second term, and given the more negative value of E(˜  T2)( a s
losses are subject to higher personal taxrates but proﬁts remain subject to an unchanged
corporate rate). Higher corporate taxrates, in contrast, reduce the ﬁrst and third terms,
26 This possibility was the focus in Gentry and Hubbard (2000). Note, however, that the actual U.S. tax
schedule is not strictly progressive, due for example to the EITCand the phasing out of the payroll tax
above some income level.
9but make the second term less negative; the net eﬀect depends on the relative sizes of these
oﬀsetting changes.
The decisions on K and L both aﬀect the scale of the ﬁrm, so the amount of overall risk-
taking. Assuming that Hp > 0, so that the individual spends some time as an entrepreneur,























Here, taxes aﬀect investment incentives in exactly the same way they aﬀect the allocation
of labor eﬀort to the ﬁrm.27
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal number of employees, L, diﬀers in structure
from that for K and He simply because labor costs are deductible business expenses rather

















The key diﬀerence from the previous expressions is that the income-shifting term now
disappears, since all transactions are within the ﬁrm. Taxes still provide a net subsidy to
hiring new workers, at least as long as E(˜  T2) < 0.
We ﬁnd that the taxsubsidy term for K is proportionately larger than that for L,b y
the ratio (1−Te
2)/(1−Te
1) > 1. Taxes therefore should increase the capital/labor ratio of an
entrepreneurial ﬁrm, and more so the larger the size of this “income-shifting” taxterm. 28
Note, however, given the deﬁnition of proﬁts, that any increase in the capital/labor ratio,
holding expected output ﬁxed, reduces the chance of losses, since proﬁts are measured net
of labor costs but not net of capital costs. This will be important below.
27 Recall that, for simplicity, we have assumed that statutory taxable income equals economic proﬁts.
If we assume that tax depreciation is less than economic depreciation, then there would be an additional
negative eﬀect of high tax rates on investment, in proportion to Te
2.
28 Carroll et al (1998) provide empirical evidence that entrepreneurs have fewer employees when they face
a higher tax rate. While they attribute this to the higher tax rate discouraging entrepreneurial activity,
our model suggests instead that the higher tax rate may simply be inducing these ﬁrms to substitute
capital for labor.
10T h ec h o i c ef o rs is clearly a key issue when considering the eﬀects of taxes on risk-taking.
The ﬁrst-order condition can be expressed as















Without taxes, the trade-oﬀ simply involves comparing the higher expected return on the
left-hand side of the equation with the cost of bearing the extra risk on the right-hand
side. Taxes reduce these costs of risk-bearing for two reasons. The ﬁrst corresponds to the
Domar-Musgrave eﬀect, while the second again captures the expected tax payments on the
random return ˜  . Both terms are proportional to those appearing in the other ﬁrst-order
conditions.
One omission from the above model is taxevasion. Small businesses should ﬁnd it
relatively easy to underreport their taxable income, e.g. by selling output for cash and
not registering the sale, or by reporting as business expenses the purchase of personal
consumption items. As a result, a ﬁrm should face an eﬀective taxrate below the statutory
rate on revenue and an eﬀective rate at least equal to the statutory rate on expenses.
Unfortunately, in our data set, we do not observe revenue and expenses separately for
individual businesses, only the net proﬁts, making any test for taxevasion diﬃcult. We
did try testing whether the eﬀective taxrate on ﬁrms with net proﬁts was reduced, relative
to what would be forecast based on statutory rates. While estimates were in the expected
direction,29 standard errors were so large that we felt unable to pursue this complication
in the current paper.
2. Estimation strategy
Data set
Our empirical tests make use of a series of cross-section samples of personal income tax
returns made available by the U.S. Statistics of Income, for twenty-two years between 1964
29 None of our other results were aﬀected qualitatively.
11and 1993.30 For each taxreturn in a year, there are data on all the major entries on the
taxreturn.
The strength of this data set is that it is large, spans several major taxreforms, and con-
tains very accurate information about the personal income taxincentives each household
faces. It does suﬀer the drawback, however, that we have very little nontaxinformation
about these individuals to use as controls. For example, we do not know the sex, race,
education, or age of members of the sample, other than if they are over age 65. For joint
ﬁlers, we do not know whether both members of the couple work, or who is self-employed.
These limitations shape the structure of the empirical analysis described below.
Measurement of “entrepreneurial”activity
Based on the taxreturn alone, there is no way to judge with conﬁdence whether anyone in
a household is engaged in “entrepreneurial” activity. To begin with, there is no way to dis-
tinguish corporate entrepreneurial income from income from passive ﬁnancial investments
in corporate equity. In particular, corporate entrepreneurial income is likely not to gener-
ate much dividend income — if the entrepreneur wants to extract money from her ﬁrm,
wage payments, loans (either from the ﬁrm or with the ﬁrm’s shares used as collateral),
and sale of shares all dominate dividends for taxpurposes. High dividend income therefore
is not a good indicator of entrepreneurial activity, while capital gains from shares in one’s
own business would be indistinguishable from capital gains on passive investments.
Positive noncorporate income is also not a good indicator of entrepreneurial activity. As
described above, most all entrepreneurs had a taxincentive to incorporate whenever their
ﬁrms are proﬁtable. Entrepreneurial proﬁts would therefore be reported as noncorporate
income only if they were small, so insuﬃcient to raise T 
p above τ  −θ(1−τ ). As a result,
positive noncorporate income would be subject to a potentially severe truncation bias,
with a truncation point depending on relative taxrates.
30 While SOI data exist for 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1966-1993, coverage varied by year. Given our speciﬁc
data requirements, we were able to make use of data only for 1964, 1966, 1968, 1972-3, 1975, 1977, and
1979-93. We thank the Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan for making these
Individual Master File data series available to us.
12In measuring entrepreneurial activity, we therefore chose to focus on reported noncor-
porate losses. As described above, anticipated entrepreneurial losses would be reported as
noncorporate rather than corporate income, given the no-loss-oﬀset restrictions under the
corporate but not the personal income tax, as long as θ<T  
p(˜ I). In addition, given the
typical lifecycle of a ﬁrm, losses likely indicate the recent entry of a ﬁrm, so should respond
much more to recent taxchanges than would the continuing income of older noncorporate
ﬁrms.
Of course, not all noncorporate losses represent losses from self-employment. For ex-
ample, prior to 1986 taxshelters generated considerable noncorporate losses. In order
to try to screen out such taxshelter losses, so that the empirical work focuses more
closely on entrepreneurial activity, we chose to classify reported noncorporate losses as
“entrepreneurial” only if they were larger (in absolute value) than 10% of reported wage
and salary income.31 32 As sensitivity tests, we tried both varying this cut-oﬀ percentage
and restricting the sample to proprietorships.
In addition, we chose to limit our measure of noncorporate losses to losses from propri-
etorships, partnerships, and subchapter S corporations, speciﬁcally excluding losses from
real estate and farming. Farming and real estate normally run losses for taxpurposes,
given the favorable taxtreatment of both sectors, 33 so that the presence of losses in these
sectors conveys diﬀerent information than would be the case in other occupations.
In the empirical work, we focus simply on whether or not an individual reports large
enough business losses, as deﬁned above. This indicator of entrepreneurial activity is easily
measured in our data set, and should be relatively free of selection biases.
One immediate question, though, is how closely this indicator of entrepreneurial activity
corresponds to other measures of the extent of entrepreneurial activity. For any given indi-
31 While losses from proprietorships should not include losses from passive ﬁnancial investments, we use
the same sample restriction on proprietorship losses as well, in order to avoid treating diﬀerent organi-
zational forms diﬀerently. Otherwise, the estimates would in part reﬂect factors aﬀecting the choice of
organizational form.
32 One further advantage of including this cut-oﬀ is that our estimates become less sensitive to possible
ﬁxed costs of becoming an entrepreneur, costs ignored in the above derivations.
33 This favorable tax treatment arises in large part simply because land and buildings provide very good
collateral for loans. Both activities therefore have unusually large interest deductions.
13vidual, a natural measure of the extent of an individual’s engagement in “entrepreneurial”
activity is sf/wH, which measures the extent of their entrepreneurial risk-taking relative
to their potential labor income.34 Business losses will be greater in absolute value than










where A = sf/wH,a n dB equals the second term. If B does not vary across individuals,
then there would be a one-to-one link between our indicator for entrepreneurial activity
and this underlying desired measure, A.
While this second term, B, is unaﬀected at the margin by changes in s or in L,i ti sa n
increasing function of Hp and of K. Any increase in B dampens the eﬀects of changes in
A, since they move in opposite directions in response to changes in Hp and K.T h i sh a s
two implications. First, as seen below, we may be too conservative in our inferences about
the eﬀects of taxchanges on this underlying measure of entrepreneurial activity, sf/wH.
In addition, there will be a particular downward bias in the eﬀects of the ﬁrst taxterm in
equations (1) and (2) on our indicator of entrepreneurial activity, since this term aﬀects
Hp and K while not aﬀecting s and L, whereas the other two taxterms aﬀect all four
aspects of behavior equally.
Sample selection
The estimation sample was limited so that we could focus on a subset of individuals where
the analysis would be clearest. To begin with, we excluded any observation reporting
a deduction for being over age 65 or reporting pension income, on the grounds that self-
employment decisions of the elderly and retired can have very diﬀerent patterns than those
for younger taxpayers. Similarly, we dropped those who claimed to be a dependent of
another taxpayer, or who reported neither wage nor self-employment income. In addition
we dropped anyone reporting farming income larger in absolute value than ten percent
34 It is the risk-taking, rather than self-employment per se, that should generate information externalities
to others.
14of wage and salary income, since farmers have an additional choice whether to include
nonfarm self-employment income on Schedule F.
Other sample restrictions were chosen in response to problems we faced in measuring
the earnings ability of each individual. The likelihood of self-employment is inevitably
a nonlinear function of this measure. One key problem is that for joint ﬁlers we do not
know whether one or both members of the couple work, and who (if anyone) is reporting
self-employment income. Given that the interpretation of the data for single individuals35
is so much clearer than for joint ﬁlers, we chose to limit the empirical work to single
individuals. Note that a sample of single taxpayers will tend to be younger and have lower
taxable income than would a sample that included joint ﬁlers as well.
Finally, we wanted to measure an individual’s earnings ability relative to that of others
in the same year, requiring a stable sample selection in each year. Yet the characteristics
of the set of individuals who choose to ﬁle taxreturns changes over time, due to changes in
minimum taxable income and the introduction in 1975 of the earned income tax credit. To
minimize variation in our sample composition over time, we decided to drop the bottom
few percent of the sample, based on forecasted earnings.36
Measurement of earnings ability
As in the theoretical model, we deﬁne an individual’s earnings ability to equal her
forecasted earnings if she is not self-employed.37 This information about earnings if not
self-employed is also an essential input when calculating each individual’s taxincentives.
We then face the inherent problem that this information cannot be observed for the self-
35 “Single” here is a shorthand for all nonjoint ﬁlers, including married ﬁling separately, head of household,
a n dw i d o w ,a sw e l la ss i n g l e .
36 In particular, we started with 1979, and chose a cut-oﬀ for forecasted earnings so that 5% of the sample
was dropped in that year. In 1977 (1980), we then calculated the percent by which average forecasted
earnings in that year diﬀered from those in 1979 for those above the 1979 cut-oﬀ. We then adjusted the
cut-oﬀ by this percent and used it as the cut-oﬀ for 1977 (1980). The same procedure was then extended
through the rest of the sample.
37 Here, we deﬁne as self-employed anyone with an absolute value of noncorporate income (and not just
losses) exceeding ten percent of wage and salary income.
15employed, so must be forecasted. Any forecasting procedure, however, must not create
artiﬁcial diﬀerences between the self-employed vs. employees.38
The basic strategy we adopted was to search for instruments that help forecast earnings
while not self-employed but which are not correlated with the self-employment decision. In
choosing instruments, we were restricted to using information available on the taxreturns.
The instruments we chose were: indicators for each ﬁling status, an indicator for other
dependents, ln(number of dependents if nonzero), indicators for whether interest income,
dividend income, property taxdeductions, or mortgage interest deductions are reported,
and the logs of the dollar amount of each of these ﬁnancial variables, if nonzero. See the
Appendixfor a description of the tests we undertook to justify this choice of instruments.
Let the resulting forecasting equation in year t for earnings ability for individual i
equal39
ln(wit)=Zitbt +˜ ηit,
where wit is labor income while not self-employed and Zit is a vector of instruments.
We estimated this equation using a sample of workers who were not self-employed. The
resulting forecast for earnings ability, denoted by ˆ wit, is a key input in the estimation.
Empirical speciﬁcation
The basic objective of the empirical work will be to estimate how the taxincentives
described in equations (1) through (4) aﬀect the probability that an individual has non-
corporate losses exceeding ten percent of wage and salary income, controlling for an in-
dividual’s earnings ability and time-varying factors. Given the large size of our data set
(over two million individual taxreturns), and given the need to simulate numerically the
eﬀects of entrepreneurial risk on each of the taxmeasures for each individual, we felt it
38 For example, Gentry and Hubbard (2000) measure the earnings ability of the self-employed by whatever
wage and salary income they continue to earn. Since these individuals are not full-time employees, this
systematically underestimates their earnings ability, introducing biases into the coeﬃcient estimates.
39 In fact, we estimated ﬁve diﬀerent regressions, based on which instruments were available for each
individual. See the Appendix for details.
16necessary to group the data by predicted earnings ability, rather than estimate a discrete
choice model using the individual data.40
In particular, we grouped the data each year into sixquantiles based on each individ-
ual’s value for ˆ wit. One quantile included all those whose forecasted earnings were in the
bottom 70% of the population.41 The ﬁve additional quantiles represented those whose
forecasted earnings were in the following percentile ranges in the population: (70,80],
(80,90], (90,95], (95,99], and (99,100].42 While this grouping implies that we ignore within
group variation, little information is lost since forecasted earnings is the only independent
variable of importance for each individual.43










αjτjqt + δq + γt +˜ χqt. (6)
Here, Pqt equals the observed fraction of quantile q in year t that has business losses
exceeding 10% of wage and salary income, while τjqt is the average value for taxmeasure j
(to be deﬁned below) in quantile q in year t. In addition, δq and γt represent quantile and
time dummies respectively. This speciﬁcation therefore represents a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimation procedure, comparing the relative changes in taxincentives over time across
diﬀerent quantiles with the relative changes in the dependent variable.
One technical complication with this speciﬁcation, that turns out to be of little matter
empirically but that we felt we should take into account nonetheless, is that the predicted
ability quantiles will not be entirely consistent over time. For example, our success in
forecasting earnings depends on the fraction of people who itemize, a fraction that varies
40 Even with this grouping into quantiles, constructing the data for each linear regression we ultimately
run takes over a day of computer time.
41 This group almost entirely consisted of those whose instruments were equal to zero except for the
demographic dummy variables. These individuals therefore had virtually identical expected earnings.
42 Again due to the large sample size, our calculations were based on a randomly chosen subsample of
25% of those in the bottom 70% of the population, a 50% subsample for those in each of the next four
quantiles, and a 100% sample of the top quantile.
43 Note that grouping the data introduces no statistical bias as long as the information used to allocate
people to groups is independent of the residual. Our instruments were chosen based on this consideration.
17considerably over time. If we had instead started with an underlying model based on
individual data which included (unobserved) true ability dummies, and aggregated this
across individuals within each predicted-ability quantile, the resulting speciﬁcation would
include additional terms capturing the fraction in each predicted quantile that fall within










αjτjqt + δq + γt +
 
a
daµaq +˜ χqt, (7)
where µaq equals the fraction in each predicted-ability quantile q that has true ability in
quantile a.45
We then estimate this equation using OLS. Throughout, we report robust standard
errors. Given that the deﬁnition of the various τjqt depend on θ and β,w ee xp l o r et h e
implications of the data for these parameters by minimizing the sum of squared residuals,
e.g. nonlinear least squares.46
Figure 2 graphs the resulting data for Pqt. Here, we see evidence of higher losses in
1973, at the time of the 1973 oil shock, and also perhaps during the recession of 1981-3.
While these business cycle eﬀects are not that dramatic, we still felt justiﬁed in including
time dummies as controls, in part to capture as well any changes over time in the ease of
self-employment due to changes in technology or in the legal climate.47
44 If we aggregate from individual data, though, the dependent variable becomes avg[ln(Pit/(1−Pit))] ≈
ln(Pqt/(1 − Pqt)) − .5E((Pit − Pqt)/Pqt)2. The predicted-ability quantile dummies are still needed to
capture the eﬀects of the second term in this equation.
45 In particular, for any value for predicted ability, ˆ wit, the distribution of true ability, wit satisﬁes
ln(wit)=l n (ˆ wit)+˜ ηit. Based on this probability distribution, we can easily compute the probability, for
any given ˆ wit, that true ability will be in each of the six true-ability quantiles.
46 To justify this statistical procedure formally, we assume that the ˜ χqt are homoskedastic and distributed
normally, in which case nonlinear least squares is equivalent to maximum likelihood. If the ˜ χqt are
heteroskedastic and nonnormal, our estimates will still be unbiased, even though these deviations generate
some ineﬃciency in the statistical estimation procedure.
47 For example, the rules to qualify for subchapter S status were relaxed substantially during our sample
period.
18Measurement of the tax variables
Given the discussion in the theory section, we included the following taxvariables in the
analysis:48




2) τ2qt ≡ avgi∈qsE(˜  T2)/(1 − Te
1) (“subsidy to risk”)





cov((˜ IN,s˜  (1 − T2))/(1 − Te
1) (“Domar-Musgrave term”)
Measuring these taxvariables involves many complications. To begin with, since they
measure marginal incentives, their values depend on the particular allocation of time and
resources that the individual has chosen. In general, there is a multidimensional schedule of
these marginal incentives, looking across all possible individual allocation decisions. Given
the individual’s preferences, one point on these schedules maximizes utility, but this point
is clearly endogenous.
In order to avoid any bias due to this endogeneity, we chose to summarize these sched-
ules by calculating their values at one common point for all individuals.49 Starting from
this point, we calculated the values of each of the τjit for each individual, taking into
account the uncertainty in ˜  it and the option to report some income as corporate for any
given expost value of ˜ it.50 The resulting estimates for each of the τjit are then averaged
across all individuals in each quantile.
There were a variety of complications that arose in characterizing the relevant tax
schedules at any date. To begin with, due care is taken to include the eﬀects of the
earned income taxcredit (introduced in 1975) and the max imum taxon earned income (in
48 Note that the denominator in the tax terms diﬀers among the various ﬁrst-order conditions. We
conduct sensitivity tests below to see if this matters.
49 In particular, we calculate the eﬀects of marginal changes in behavior starting from a situation where
each individual is spending 80% of her time as an employee and 20% working on the side as an entrepreneur.
In forecasting potential wage and salary income, for those who are not self-employed we used their actual
wages, while for those who are self-employed (those with either noncorporate proﬁts or losses exceeding
10% of wage income) we drew a value for ˜ ηit from a normal distribution with the estimated standard
deviation. Self-employment income is assumed to be random and distributed normally with a standard
deviation which we initially set equal to twice its mean (e.g., s = 2). We report sensitivity tests below for
alternative values of s.
50 We drew twenty representative values for ˜  it for each individual, at the points where the cumulative
normal distribution equals .025,.05,...,.95,.975. See the Appendix for further detail about the procedures.
19eﬀect during 1971-80). In addition, as emphasized by Bruce (2000), we felt it important
to take into account the eﬀects of the payroll tax. While wage and salary income and
(positive) partnership and proprietorship income51 are both subject to the payroll tax,
corporate income is not. Therefore, the payroll taxpotentially provides a strong incentive
encouraging entrepreneurial activity, and reporting business income as corporate.
While the statutory payroll taxrates are clear, the key complication is the fact that
extra covered earnings under the payroll tax can increase future Social Security beneﬁts.
Diamond and Gruber (1997) ﬁnd that the eﬀective payroll taxrate is roughly the same
across income levels. However, it is much lower for the primary worker in a married couple,
and is much higher for the secondary worker. Unfortunately, we do not know the gender of
a single worker or head of household, nor their past (or future!) marital status. For those
who are not self-employed, we simply assume that the present value of added beneﬁts
in response to an extra dollar of covered income equals half of the combined statutory
OASDI taxpayments by both employees and employers. The self-employed receive the
same beneﬁts per dollar of covered earnings but can face diﬀerent payroll taxrates. We
pay careful attention to the details of the payroll taxcode and any interactions with the
personal income taxcode.
There is also one issue that arises in the measurement of the corporate taxrate. As
described in Sommerfeld (1981) and Sommerfeld and Jones (1991), except during a short
period following a taxreform in 1974, ﬁrms have been allowed to divide their income
among several corporations in order to take repeated advantage of the initial brackets of
the corporate taxschedule. We therefore ex plore two alternative assumptions. In one, we
simply set the corporate taxrate equal to the minimum available corporate taxrate. In
the second, we ignore this ﬂexibility to divide income among diﬀerent ﬁrms and use the
full corporate taxschedule.
If an individual chooses to report self-employment income as corporate, an additional
complication is any personal taxes due on this corporate income when it is paid out as
51 Subchapter S income, in contrast, is not subject to the payroll tax, a complication we ignore given
the small size of this sector. We did, though, investigate whether the fraction of large losses reported in
subchapter S form varied depending on the diﬀerence in tax incentives, taking into account this eﬀect of
the payroll tax. Estimated eﬀects were in the expected direction.
20dividends, or when the shares are sold generating capital gains income. A small closely
held ﬁrm would rarely pay dividends, given the resulting taxpenalty, so we ignore dividend
taxation. Capital gains taxes are a more complicated issue. When an entrepreneur sells
shares in her ﬁrm, capital gains taxes are due. The eﬀective capital gains tax rate, however,
needs to reﬂect the gains from deferral and possible write-up of basis at death. It has
become common to assume, following Feldstein, Dicks-Mireau, and Poterba (1983), that
the eﬀective taxrate on capital gains from portfolio trades equals .25gt,w h e r et is the
person’s ordinary taxrate, g is the fraction of capital gains included in taxable income,
while the factor .25 reﬂects a presumed halving of the eﬀective taxrate due to deferral
and another halving due to the write-up of basis at death. We will use this measure to
calculate the eﬀective value of τ  in most of our speciﬁcations.
While standard, however, this assumption about the eﬀective capital gains taxrate
clearly ignores a wide variety of issues. For example, the eﬀective capital gains tax rate
on new businesses diﬀers from that on portfolio holdings of equity for several reasons. To
begin with, IRC section 1244 allows capital losses on small business stock to be treated
as ordinary losses, regardless of holding period, and imposes much higher limits on the
amount of losses that can be taken compared with other capital losses.52 In addition, the
sale of shares is much more likely to involve a sale of the ﬁrm. Any purchaser of the ﬁrm
will be able to take additional amortization and depreciation deductions beyond those still
available to the original entrepreneur since the taxbasis for the ﬁrm’s capital jumps to
the current market value. The resulting taxsavings reduce the eﬀective surtaxabove the
corporate rate that is owed due to the realization of capital gains/losses, and can easily
lead to a negative eﬀective capital gains taxrate. 53
A further consideration pushing in the opposite direction is that any deferral of the
realization of capital gains may leave the individual facing a binding liquidity constraint,
forcing a reduction in current consumption even though the present value of consumption
increases. At the margin, the taxsavings from further deferral are just oﬀset by the
52 For example, as of 1978 a single individual could take up to $50,000 in ordinary losses from such stock,
in addition to the amount of capital losses that can normally be deducted.
53 For further discussion, see Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987).
21utility loss from the associated deferral of consumption. If any deferral begins to reduce
current consumption below the desired level, then the net gains from deferral would be
approximately half of the associated tax savings, suggesting an eﬀective capital gains tax
rate of .5gt.
With these conﬂicting arguments, the Feldstein, Dicks-Mireau, and Poterba (1983)
assumption that the eﬀective capital gains taxrate equals .25gt seems a good compromise.
As a statistical test, however, we will also explore what happens if we ignore capital gains
taxes, on the presumption that the certainty-equivalent additional tax payments are small
or negative.
3. Estimation Results
In addition to the complications described above in calculating taxincentives, we also
faced the problem that the taxvariables depend on θ, the ﬁxed costs of incorporating, and
β, the measure of risk aversion. Each of these parameters enters in a nonlinear fashion
into the calculation of the taxeﬀects. Given the substantial computer time required in the
estimation, we found it infeasible to solve for the values of θ and β that jointly minimize
the sum of squared residuals. Instead, the results reported below provide a more limited
summary of the eﬀects of these parameters on the results.
a. β =0a n dθ =0
Our initial speciﬁcation searches impose the simplifying assumptions that individuals
are risk neutral and that only taxes aﬀect the decision to incorporate (i.e., θ =0 ) .W h e n
β = 0, it immediately follows that τ3qt = 0, while Te
1it and Te
2it are expected values
rather than certainty equivalents. By self-selection, entrepreneurs are likely to be much
less risk averse than a representative member of the population, so this assumption may
not be too extreme. In any case, we test it below. We also explore below possible nontax
beneﬁts/costs of incorporation.
Our initial focus is on various subsidiary assumptions used in the construction of the
taxvariables. Our own initial prior, as discussed above, was that the eﬀective corporate tax
rate equals the minimum corporate rate, following the claims in Sommerfeld (1981) that
small corporations can easily be divided into multiple corporations for taxpurposes. In
22addition, we followed the conventional approach and set the eﬀective capital gains taxrate
equal to .25gt, following Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983). In addition, we
assumed that the coeﬃcient of variation for entrepreneurial income equals 2, and classiﬁed
noncorporate losses as “entrepreneurial” only if their absolute value exceeded ten percent
of reported wage and salary income.
The resulting values for τ1qt are graphed in Figure 3 for each of the quantiles used in
the estimation. The comparable ﬁgures for −τ2qt appear in Figure 4, with the sign reversed
so that the expected correlation with the rates of large self-employment losses in Figure
2 is positive. As can be seen from the graphs, these taxincentives both grow quickly
during the 1970’s, due to the inﬂation-induced bracket creep, and then drop following the
1986 taxreform, as personal taxrates fall relative to corporate rates. This pattern very
much corresponds to the patterns seen in Figure 2 for the fraction of individuals with self-
employment losses. As seen for example in equation (1), the numerical value of τ1qt (τ2qt)
can be interpreted as a percent subsidy (tax) rate to Hp or K if positive, and a percent
tax(subsidy) rate if negative. The question we will face in the empirical work, once we
include year dummies and quantile dummies, is whether the relative changes in these tax
rates over time correspond to the relative changes in self-employment rates.
The resulting estimates for the coeﬃcients of τ1qt and τ2qt for our base case speciﬁcation
are reported in row 1 of Table 1.54 The variable τ2qt measures the expected tax payments
on the random component of entrepreneurial income. If this expected payment is negative,
yielding a subsidy to risk-taking, then Pqt should be higher, implying a negative coeﬃcient.
The estimated coeﬃcient in fact is negative, strongly statistically signiﬁcant, and very
large in economic terms. For example, if the average value, τ2qt, faced by those in the top
quantile were replaced by the average value of those in the bottom quantile, a change of
.049,55 then the forecasted percent change in Pqt satisﬁes
1
Pqt
∆Pqt ≈ α2(1 − Pqt)∆τ2qt.
54 All speciﬁcations include time dummies, quantile dummies, and the variables µaq that measure the
distribution of those in a given group across true ability quantiles.
55 While τ1qt would also change with such a tax reform, given the estimated coeﬃcient of τ1qt the
estimated eﬀect of this change is trivial.
23Given that individuals in the top quantile had an observed Pqt ≈ .08 in 1993, shifting to
the value of τ1qt faced by those in the bottom quantile implies a 74% fall in the probability
of being an entrepreneur!
The forecasted eﬀect of τ1qt is less clear. Our presumption has been that a high tax
rate on wage and salary income compared with entrepreneurial income certainly should
increase the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. However, as noted above, it also
should lead new ﬁrms to use a higher capital/labor ratio, implying higher proﬁts and a
lower probability of taxlosses. The estimated coeﬃcient is in fact positive, but rather
small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
We emphasized above some of the complications in measuring the eﬀective capital gains
taxrate and the appropriate corporate taxrate. To test the sensitivity of our results to
our base-case assumptions, we explored alternatives in rows 2 and 3 of Table 1. In row 2
of Table 1, we set the eﬀective capital gains taxrate to zero. In row 3, we assumed that
corporations must consolidate their income for taxpurposes, so face the full corporate tax
schedule rather than the minimum corporate rate. In both rows, the qualitative results are
unchanged, but the sum of squared residuals is a bit larger than in our initial speciﬁcation.
As a result, we will maintain our original assumptions in each case.
Another question in our initial speciﬁcation is what level of risk faced in an en-
trepreneurial ﬁrm provides the best summary measure when constructing the taxvari-
ables. In particular, the larger this risk, the larger the degree to which nonlinearities in
both the personal and the corporate taxschedule aﬀect the constructed taxvariables. Ini-
tially, we assumed that the standard deviation of entrepreneurial income is twice its mean
(s = 2). In row 4 of Table 1, we assume instead that entrepreneurial income is riskless,
implying by construction that τ2qt = 0. Now, the coeﬃcient of τ1qt is positive and strongly
statistically signiﬁcant — the larger the taxrate on wage and salary income compared
with entrepreneurial income the higher the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.56
However, the sum of squared residuals is much worse.57 When we set s =1o rs =3t h e
56 This speciﬁcation is included in part because it serves as a reduced-form summary of the data.
57 Throughout the Tables, the reported sum of squared residuals have been divided by the degrees of
freedom.
24sum of squared residuals in both cases was also worse than with s = 2, as seen in rows 5-6,
suggesting that our original choice was a reasonable one.58
One minor ambiguity in our derivation is whether the denominator in the taxterms
should include Te
1 or Te
2 — some ﬁrst-order conditions contain one and some contain
the other. As a sensitivity test, we reestimated our speciﬁcation using Te
2 instead in the
denominator. The results appear in row 7 of Table 1. As expected, not much changes.
Since the sum of squared residuals is slightly worse, we stick with our initial speciﬁcation.
A further sensitivity test we tried was to interact each taxvariable with a dummy
variable indicating whether this taxvariable, or both taxvariables, had become more
generous since the previous year. Our intuition was that ideas that are not quite proﬁtable
to pursue under current taxlaw may accumulate over time “on the shelf.” If and when
the taxlaw becomes more generous, there could be a surge of new entry. No such surge
showed up in the data: the eﬀects of increases and decreases in taxincentives appeared to
be symmetric.
Another debatable assumption used in the construction of the data was the decision to
classify noncorporate losses as “entrepreneurial” only if they exceed 10% of reported wage
and salary income. Our hope was that this assumption would lead us to drop from the self-
employed most of the individuals whose noncorporate losses simply arose from portfolio
investments in taxshelters. Row 8 in Table 1 reports results using a 20% ex clusion rule.
The qualitative results are entirely unchanged.59
As an additional test of the plausibility of our assumption, we looked more closely
at data in the taxreturns for the period after the 1986 taxreform, when tax payers were
required to classify any partnership or S-corporate income as “passive” or “active.”60 Using
58 When s is smaller, nonlinearities in the tax schedules have a smaller numerical eﬀect on the tax
variables. We ﬁnd that the size of the coeﬃcients adjusts to compensate.
59 Note that the sum of squared residuals is no longer comparable, since the deﬁnition of the dependent
variable has changed.
60 The restrictions that needed to be satisﬁed for income to be “active” according to the tax law, however,
may be tighter than would be appropriate given our objective to measure start-up activity. For example,
if a partner works fewer than 500 hours in the ﬁrm, then the income is reported as “passive” unless (s)he is
the principle manager for this activity. Yet many start-up partnerships may be second jobs for individuals,
at least initially, in which case the income will likely be classiﬁed as passive according to the tax law,
except for one of the partners.
25data from 1990, we calculated the fraction of individuals classiﬁed as entrepreneurs based
on our 10% rule (or some other percent rule) who are not active participants according
to the taxreturn. Using the 10% rule, 10.1% of those we classify as entrepreneurs were
“passive” investors according to the taxreturn. If instead we had used a 0% rule, implying
no exclusions, the error rate would have jumped to 17.5%. Tightening the restriction to
20% of wage and salary income also leads to a slightly higher error rate of 10.8%.
These error rates are not large overall, but in part because “proprietorship” income
is always viewed to be active. In contrast, the error rate for partnerships under our 10%
rule is 48.7% — of the partners whose losses we count as entrepreneurial, almost half were
classiﬁed as “passive” investors under the taxlaw. 61 Since income from proprietorships
is always viewed to be active, we tried as an alternative sensitivity test looking at the
probability that an individual has proprietorship losses exceeding 10% of labor income.
The resulting estimates are in row 9 of Table 1. Again the estimates are in line with the
previous rows. They would be expected to be slightly smaller, since we are including fewer
forms of entrepreneurial activity. The coeﬃcients perhaps also should be a bit smaller
because the choice to set up a proprietorship vs. a partnership or subchapter S ﬁrm can
be correlated with these taxincentives — when taxincentives are stronger, the resulting
ﬁrm is likely to be larger so is more likely to have more than one owner. The estimated
coeﬃcients are in fact slightly smaller, but by little enough that we see no evidence of any
important bias in our original speciﬁcation.
One other implicit assumption in our speciﬁcation is that all quantiles are equally
responsive to taxincentives, since we have a common coeﬃcient on the taxvariables
for all quantiles. Yet we know little about the underlying distribution of entrepreneurial
ability, a, in the population, so have no strong basis to impose this assumption on the
data. To test for diﬀerences in responsiveness across quantiles, we chose to hold ﬁxed the
coeﬃcients on τ1qt and τ2qt, and interact this weighted-average taxvariable with the six
quantile dummies. The resulting coeﬃcient on the taxvariable for the lowest quantile
was slightly larger than the others, which were all tightly grouped. However, the resulting
61 This error rate is again higher at a 0% or a 20% cut-oﬀ. The error rate for subchapter S corporations,
in contrast, is only 10.1%.
26F-test for whether we could reject equal coeﬃcients for the sixquantiles had a p-value of
only .306. Given the lack of any statistical support for diﬀering responsiveness by quantile,
we maintained our assumption of equal responsiveness.
A related assumption is that all quantiles are equally responsive to macroeconomic
changes, as captured by the time dummies. To test this, we interacted a group of explicit
macroeconomic variables, described below, with the expected-earnings dummies. The tax
coeﬃcients were left qualitatively unaﬀected, and we saw no obvious patterns and very few
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients among these various interaction terms.
Based on these initial sensitivity tests, we feel conﬁdent in sticking with the speciﬁcation
in row 1 as our base case.
b. θ  =0 ,β =0
I nT a b l e2 ,w eﬁ r s te xp l o r ea l t e r n a t i v ev a l u e sf o r θ. Our base case is reproduced as
row 1. In row 2, we test the alternative extreme assumption that θ = −∞, implying
suﬃcient nontaxcosts from incorporating that ﬁrms would always remain noncorporate. 62
Under this assumption, the sum of squared residuals is far worse, neither coeﬃcient has
the expected sign, and both are very close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. The
option to incorporate is certainly of importance to potential entrepreneurs according to
our estimates.
One key complication in testing alternative values of θ is that any nonnegative value of
θ, implying a nontaxadvantage to incorporating, creates a selection bias in our sample of
entrepreneurial losses. Since business losses are deductible against other income under the
personal taxwhile we assume that corporations with taxlosses simply pay zero corporate
taxes, all ﬁrms with expected tax losses will be noncorporate when θ = 0. In general,
however, any ﬁrm with taxlosses that faces T 
p <θwould instead choose to incorporate:
the nontaxsavings from incorporating then outweigh the potential gains from deducting
business losses under the personal tax.
Let ξ denote the fraction of individuals in a quantile with business losses that choose to
remain noncorporate, so face T 
p ≥ θ. We then observe not the true probability P ∗ that an
62 This was the implicit assumption, for example, in Gentry and Hubbard (2000) and in Carroll et al
(2000).
27individual has business losses exceeding 10% of wage and salary income, but instead observe
P ≡ ξP∗. Given our theory, the correct dependent variable would be ln(P ∗/(1 − P ∗)),
whereas the dependent variable we have been using is ln(P/(1 − P)). However, since P ∗
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When considering positive values of θ, we will then add ln(ξ) as an additional control
variable on the right-hand side, with an expected coeﬃcient of one.63
We then conducted a grid search over several values of θ. The value that minimized
the sum of squared residuals is approximately θ = .12,64 implying that a ﬁrm can obtain
a 12% increase in pretaxproﬁts by incorporating. 65 The resulting estimates for the other
coeﬃcients are reported in row 3 of Table 2. The coeﬃcient on the selection term, ln(ξ),
equals 1.00: since its standard error is large, it is certainly not statistically diﬀerent from
1.00! The other two taxcoeﬃcients hardly change. 66
In order to test for the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimate for θ, we chose to use a
likelihood ratio test. According to this test,
 
(n − k)(R − 1) should have a t distribution,
where n−k is the degrees of freedom left in row 3, and R is the ratio of the sum of squared
residuals in row 1 to those in row 3.67 Given the estimates reported in Table 2, the value
of this statistic is 2.6, implying that θ is statistically diﬀerent from zero.68
c. θ = .12 and β>0
63 We construct the forecasted values of ξ using the same assumptions employed in constructing the
various tax variables.
64 The other values we tried locally were .10 and .14.
65 Using a totally diﬀerent approach, Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) also estimated the nontax gain
from incorporating, by industry, and found much larger ﬁgures in most industries.
66 Note, however, that the values of τjqt are aﬀected by θ, since individuals now incorporate even when
they could have saved some taxes by remaining noncorporate, making the coeﬃcients hard to compare
without more eﬀort.
67 Here, we take the ratio of the sum of squared residuals not normalized for degrees of freedom.
68 Technically, this is a joint test of the signiﬁcance of both θ and the coeﬃcient of ln(ξ).
28The mean-variance objective function used above is consistent with the underlying




Maximizing this function is equivalent to maximizing EC−(b/2)var(C). We allowed tastes
to vary by individual, however, assuming that b = β/wH,f o rs o m eβ. Given this functional
form, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at any value of C equals βC/wH. Since, over
a lifetime, the present value of C equals the present value of wH, the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is approximately equal to β for all individuals.
The past literature has focused on such a case of constant relative risk aversion, and
many estimates for this parameter have been reported in the literature. A recent paper,
based on survey data and reported in Barsky et al (1997), reports a mean value for β of
4.17. Our prior was therefore that β should be in this range.
While our speciﬁcation builds in an assumption of constant relative risk aversion when
looking over time and across people, however, it still assumes constant absolute risk aver-
sion for a given individual when evaluating the certainty equivalent value of any risky
project. With respect to this source of identiﬁcation for β, our priors are less well formed.
While we will focus on results for β = 4, given this ambiguity in interpretation we also
search for the value of β that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
When we allow for β  = 0, various things change. First, we need to add τ3qt to the spec-
iﬁcation, in order to control for the after-taxcost of risk bearing faced by an entrepreneur,
but not faced by employees. In addition, we now need to calculate the certainty-equivalent
rather than the expected tax rates Te
1 and Te
2, based on the simulated covariances. Because
of its eﬀect on the these taxrates, β enters in a nonlinear fashion in the estimation. In
searching over possible values of β,w es e tθ = .12, based on our previous results.70
69 Ignoring the tax law, we in fact have built in this assumption of normality into the construction of the
distribution of entrepreneurial income for each individual.
70 Results with θ = 0 are very similar, though have larger sum-of-squared residuals.
29In rows 4-7 of Table 2, we report results for β =2 ,β =4 ,β = 10, and the value
of β which minimizes the sum-of-squared residuals, which turns out to be β = 50.71 In
all cases, the taxcoeﬃcients each have the ex pected sign, and almost all are statistically
signiﬁcant. The selection term is also never statistically diﬀerent from one.
The coeﬃcients of τ2qt and τ3qt strongly interact, however, due to the correlation be-
tween these two taxex pressions. The theory forecasts that these two coeﬃcients should be
equal, since they enter together in all relevant ﬁrst-order conditions. As seen in the Table,
they are in fact virtually equal when β =2 , 72 providing some support for a value of β in
this range. Since the past literature estimating the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion has
tended to ﬁnd somewhat higher values, around four, we thought it preferable to focus on
our results assuming β = 4, on the presumption that these past estimates provide a more
convincing approach for estimating the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion than we have
available.
We again used a likelihood ratio test to judge the joint statistical signiﬁcance of the
addition of τ3qt and the modiﬁcations to τ1qt and τ2qt implied by setting β = 4 rather than
β = 0. The resulting value of
 
(n − k)(R − 1) is 3.3, providing statistical support for
importance of risk aversion in the self-employment decision.
We did not attempt a grid search over both θ and β simultaneously. The required
computer time would have been too great.
4. Discussion
Our coeﬃcient estimates are of the expected signs, and largely signiﬁcant statistically,
indicating that taxes do matter for the decision to become self-employed. How large are
the estimated eﬀects, however?
As one indication of the role of taxes, we ﬁrst explore how taxes aﬀect the cross-
sectional variation across quantiles in our indicator measure of entrepreneurial activity.
These forecasts appear in Tables 3a-c, with Table 3a reporting forecasts based on the
71 The closest alternatives we tried were 40 and 60.
72 When we constrained these two coeﬃcients to be equal, the value that minimized the sum-of-squared
residuals was between two and three.
30coeﬃcient estimates in row 1 of Table 2, those in Table 3b using the coeﬃcient estimates
from row 3 of Table 2, and Table 3c using those from row 5 of Table 2.
Consider the results ﬁrst in Table 3a, which are based on our original speciﬁcation
without risk aversion or nontaxbeneﬁts from incorporation. Here, the interpretation is
easiest. Row 1 of Table 3a reports the forecasted rates of large business losses for each
quantile based on the taxlaw in 1993. The last column reports the aggregate amount
of entrepreneurial activity, as measured by a weighted average of the probabilities that
individuals in each quantile will report noncorporate losses exceeding 10% of labor income,
weighted by their earnings ability.73 These ﬁgures imply that entrepreneurial activity is
heavily concentrated among the top one percent of the population. Row 2 reports how these
forecasts change if the minimum corporate taxrate were reduced by .05, from 15% to 10%,
reducing the taxrate on business proﬁts. Here we ﬁnd that entrepreneurial activity more
than doubles in each quantile, and in aggregate. Row 3 reports the comparable forecasts
if instead personal income taxrates were uniformly cut by ﬁve percentage points, largely
reducing the taxsavings from business losses. Our indicator of entrepreneurial activity is
now forecasted to drop by 30% in aggregate, with larger percent drops among the highest
earning quantiles. Line 4 shows what would happen under a ﬂat tax, such as proposed by
Hall and Rabushka (1995), assuming a ﬂat taxrate of 20%. 74 For those aﬀected heavily
by the progressive personal taxschedule under ex isting law, incentives should improve,
while for those who gain most from the option to incorporate, incentives worsen. Overall
among single individuals, the ﬁrst group is much more important — the aggregate value of
our indicator of self-employment activity is forecasted to increase by 15%. Consistent with
the more detailed forecasts, though, entrepreneurial activity decreases for those in the top
percentile. Line 5 provides forecasts of what will happen to the rate of self-employment
once the taxreforms of 2001 are fully enacted. Since these reforms left the corporate tax
rates unaﬀected but cut personal taxrates, particularly at the top, we ﬁnd that aggregate
forecasted entrepreneurial activity drops, by 20%, with this drop heavily concentrated in





74 Note that important tax distortions remain, since individuals do not receive tax refunds if their overall
taxable income is negative. Payroll tax distortions also remain.
31the top percentile. Finally, the last line describes what would happen if the zero bracket
were eliminated, as under a negative income tax, so that business losses would continue to
result in taxsavings even when overall tax able income is small or negative. Here, we ﬁnd a
sharp jump in our indicator of the self-employment rate. The lack of deductibility of large
losses turns out to be of major importance in the decision to become an entrepreneur.
Table 3b then reports the comparable forecasts, using the speciﬁcation that includes
a nontaxadvantage to incorporating. By the theory, (1 − ξ)% of those with business
losses larger than 10% of wage and salary income will have incorporated, due to the
nontaxadvantages of operating in the corporate form, implying that the true rate of self-
employment losses is 1/ξ times the rate calculated from reported noncorporate losses.
When we take this selection bias into account in row 1, the forecasted aggregate rate of
self-employment losses under the existing tax law in 1993 is 2.5% rather than 2.0%. Most
of the other forecasts are very similar to those in Table 3a. One minor diﬀerence is that
reducing the minimum corporate taxrate matters more for those in the lowest taxbrackets,
since the nontaxadvantage to incorporating means that these individuals are more likely
to face the corporate tax. Similarly, the negative income tax matters less in all brackets,
since fewer businesses with losses are noncorporate.
Table 3c then reports forecasts using the speciﬁcation that includes risk aversion as
well as a nontaxadvantage to incorporating. Here the results change more dramatically.
The forecasted eﬀects of risk aversion are very large. Increases in the taxrate on business
income are now more likely to encourage entrepreneurial activity, by providing greater
risk-sharing through the government. For example, a drop in the minimum corporate tax
rate is now forecast to reduce the self-employment rate, in spite of the eﬀects from the
other two taxterms pushing in the opposite direction. Similarly, a 20% ﬂat taxis forecast
to raise the self-employment rate much more than in the other cases — by raising the tax
rate on corporate income from 15% to 20%, there is additional risk sharing, a beneﬁt that
gets substantial weight according to our estimates. Since the speciﬁcation used in Table
3c not only provides the best ﬁt but captures expected eﬀects of both risk aversion and
nontaxadvantages to incorporating, we put more weight on these forecasts. Any forecasts
that are particularly sensitive to the speciﬁcation choice have to be viewed to be more
tentative, however.
32In interpreting these ﬁgures, it is important to keep in mind that our sample is not
representative of the overall U.S. population, since it does not include joint ﬁlers. Joint
ﬁlers on average face much higher marginal taxrates under the personal income tax . As
a result, in a more representative sample of the U.S. population, forecasted eﬀects in the
top few quantiles would get much more weight than they do in this sample of single ﬁlers.
How, though, do changes in this indicator for entrepreneurial activity relate to changes
in other more basic measures of entrepreneurial activity? As argued above, a natural
measure of the extent of entrepreneurial activity for any individual is sf/wH,w h i c hw e
denoted by A. From equation (5), we ﬁnd that any self-employed individual will report tax
losses from self-employment exceeding ten percent of wage and salary income if and only
if ˜  <−B/A. For a given level of potential labor income, the fraction of people, P,w h o
report such large losses then can be approximated by P ≈ Φ(−B/A)(1−F(a∗)), where Φ
is the cumulative normal distribution function, a∗ measures the minimum entrepreneurial
ability level at which an individual chooses to become an entrepreneur, and F(.)i st h e
cumulative distribution function for entrepreneurial ability.75
If the main change in behavior is simply in the number of people who engage in en-
trepreneurial activity, so in a∗, then the percent change in P simply equals the percent
change in the number of entrepreneurs. If instead, the main change in behavior is in s or
in L, then we need to relate changes in P to changes in A. If the function Φ, rather than
being a cumulative normal, equaled αA/B,f o rs o m eα, then the percent changes in A and
Φ are exactly equal. When the cumulative normal distribution is more (less) convex than
this alternative function, then the percent change in A will be smaller (larger) than the
percent change in P. Given the shape of the cumulative normal distribution function, the
percent changes in A implied by any given percent change in P is an increasing function
of the value of −B/A, since the cumulative normal becomes less convexand then concave
as −B/A becomes larger (less negative). The two percent changes are about equal for
−B/A ≈− .75, in which case the chance of large business losses for a given entrepreneur is
around 23%. By our indicator, around 2.5% of people are self-employed, whereas according
75 The approximation is that B and A here measure “typical” values for those who engage in en-
trepreneurial activity, rather than allowing values to vary as a function of each individual’s ability, a.
33to the SIPP by self-assessment 10.6% report being self-employed.76 Comparing these ﬁg-
ures, we infer that around 23.6% of those who are self-employed have large business losses
in any given year. Starting from this point, therefore, percent changes in P are roughly
equal to the percent changes in A.
Finally, if the main change in behavior is in Hp or K among existing self-employed
individuals, then B changes as well. In this case, the percent change in A would exceed
the percent change we would infer above, for any value of −B/A, due to the oﬀsetting
changes in B.
As another indication of the role of taxes in entrepreneurial activity, we decompose
the time-series variation in entrepreneurial activity in Figure 5. The solid line describes
the forecasted aggregate pattern of entrepreneurial activity over time, using our base-case
estimates. The dotted line describes the forecasted pattern, using the coeﬃcient estimates
from our base case had the taxlaw provided neutral incentives, so that τ1qt = τ2qt =0 .
Here, the variation over time in our forecast arises solely from the time dummies. The
diﬀerence between the two curves captures the forecasted eﬀects of taxes.
One striking observation in Figure 5 is that a truly neutral taxstructure is forecasted
to generate far more entrepreneurial activity than arises under any of the taxreforms
ex amined in Table 3a. Even a ﬂat taxstill leaves large taxdistortions discouraging en-
trepreneurial activity. This occurs because entrepreneurs frequently have negative overall
taxable income under the personal tax, due to large enough business losses. These losses
face a 0% taxrate while smaller losses and proﬁts face the 20% ﬂat tax , implying that a
ﬂat taxstill discourages risk taking. 77
As is clear in Figure 5, our estimated time dummies imply that much of the time-
series variation in rates of entrepreneurship is caused by other factors. To explore the
role of some other factors, we regressed these time dummies (coming from our base case
regression) against a list of macro controls.78 Results are reported in Table 4. The ﬁrst
76 We would like to thank Michelle White for providing this ﬁgure.
77 The payroll tax also distorts entrepreneurial decisions in complicated ways. Noncorporate proﬁts are
taxable under the payroll tax, but noncorporate losses are not tax deductible, discouraging risk-taking.
However, corporate proﬁts escape the payroll tax while wage and salary income does not.
78 As before, we report robust standard errors.
34variable is a control for the average taxable proﬁt rate among large ﬁrms in that year,
taken from Statistics of Income ﬁgures for ﬁrms with over a million 1993 dollars of real
assets. When large ﬁrms are more proﬁtable, due to changes in the deﬁnition of taxable
income as well as due to the business cycle, new entrants are less likely to have losses.
Through simulating the impact on the forecasted self-employment rate, we ﬁnd that if the
proﬁt rate for large ﬁrms goes up by .01, the forecasted fraction of individuals reporting
self-employment losses goes down by 23% of its initial value. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
unemployment rate has a negative eﬀect on the self-employment rate: a .01 increase in the
unemployment rate leads to a 3.7% drop in the self-employment rate. Plausibly, individuals
are more reluctant to enter into self-employment if getting back into a regular job in case
of failure is diﬃcult.79 A higher real interest rate (the T-Bill rate minus the inﬂation rate
in the CPI), also discourages self-employment: a .01 increase in the real rate lowers the
self-employment rate by 6.0%. While a higher real rate aﬀects all ﬁrms, new entrants
would normally have an unusually high investment rate, so that entry decisions would
plausibly be more responsive to ﬂuctuations in the cost of funds. Holding the real rate
ﬁxed, an increase in the inﬂation rate also discourages self-employment, perhaps because
any loans must be repaid more quickly, imposing greater liquidity pressures on new ﬁrms:
a .01 increase in the inﬂation rate is forecasted to reduce self-employment by 4.7%. As
a result, we ﬁnd that inﬂation not only creates large static distortions, as emphasized by
Feldstein (1999), but it also discourages entrepreneurial activity. As seen in column 2,
after controlling for taxes and these macroeconomic variables there is no remaining time
trend in the self-employment rate.
In examining the residuals from this regression, to see if there might be any obvious
remaining factors at work, the one obvious outlier was 1986, which is substantially larger in
absolute value than any other residual. An easy explanation is that potential entrepreneurs
in 1986 would base their entry decisions not on the existing law in 1986 but on the an-
ticipated law enacted in 1986, but phased in during 1987-8. The new law provided much
79 For similar evidence on the negative eﬀect of the unemployment rate on self-employment activity, see
Blanchﬂower (2000).
35weaker incentives for entrepreneurship, leading us to overforecast self-employment rates
simply focusing on the law in place in that year.
5. Conclusions
According to our results, “animal spirits” are not the only factor aﬀecting rates of
entrepreneurship. Taxes, and business cycle factors, matter as well. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, we ﬁnd that a cut in personal taxrates reduces entrepreneurial activity.
Such a taxcut reduces the tax es saved from deducting business losses, while proﬁts re-
main largely taxed at the corporate tax rate. As a result, risk taking is discouraged. In
addition, as emphasized by Domar and Musgrave (1944), a lower personal taxrate implies
less risk-sharing with the government, in itself making self-employment less attractive to
risk-averse individuals. The potential taxsavings from going into business simply to re-
classify earnings as corporate rather than personal income for taxpurposes also falls when
personal taxrates fall.
Taxeﬀects can be very large. For ex ample, we forecast that a shift to a 20% ﬂat tax
would virtually triple the self-employment rate. Providing further sharing of losses with
the government, through a negative income tax, is also forecast to have large eﬀects on
the self-employment rate.
Macroeconomic variables also clearly aﬀect the rate of entrepreneurial activity. In
particular, we ﬁnd that rates of activity are lower the higher the unemployment rate, the
real interest rate, and the inﬂation rate. Price stability therefore may be important for
long-run growth as well as for static eﬃciency.
In sum, taxpolicy and macroeconomic policies seem to be key factors generating en-
trepreneurial activity. If entrepreneurial activity is in fact an important source of innovative
ideas and economic growth, as suggested by Schumpeter (1976), then our forecast is that
these same policies result in faster economic growth rates. That poorer countries often have
unstable macroeconomic policies and minimal personal income taxes, so minimal sharing
of business losses with the government, is very much consistent with these forecasts. In




In order to avoid introducing endogeneity in our taxincentives and our measure of
underlying earnings potential, we predict what the relevant components of income would
be in the absence of self-employment for each taxpayer. The basic strategy is to use the
sample of individuals who are not self-employed to establish the relationships between
variables available in the taxdata and reported earnings, tax able income, and adjusted
gross income. We then use these estimated relationships to predict the income measures
for individuals who are self-employed.
For the prediction to be valuable as a counterfactual, the variables used as predictors
must be unaﬀected by an individual’s decision to be actively engaged in a business. The in-
struments we chose were: an indicator for whether property taxdeductions were reported,
ln(property taxdeductions if nonzero), an indicator for whether mortgage interest deduc-
tions were reported, ln(mortgage interest deductions if nonzero), an indicator for whether
interest income is reported, ln(interest income if nonzero), an indicator for whether divi-
dend income is reported, ln(dividend income if nonzero), an indicator for other dependents,
ln(number of dependents if nonzero), a dummy variable for each ﬁling status.
To check our presumption that these variables are unaﬀected by self-employment, we
rely on the panel data set of individual taxreturns available for 1979-1990. This ex ploratory
analysis is based on the same sample of non-elderly taxpayers as that used in our cross-
sectional analyses, except that we include joint ﬁlers as well as single ﬁlers in order to
ensure adequate sample sizes. We track the level and existence of components of income
before and after individuals enter active self-employment, using individuals who do not
enter self-employment as a control group. Individuals are assigned to the control group
if they remained not self-employed for three consecutive years, i.e. the absolute value
of any noncorporate income was below ten percent of wage and salary income in each
year. Individuals are assigned to the treatment group if they were not self-employed in
the ﬁrst year, but were self-employed in both subsequent years. In the middle of the three
years, these individuals would have spent part of the year as an employee and part being
37self-employed. Therefore, we focus on changes between the ﬁrst and the third year. The
question is then whether the proposed instruments change diﬀerently over this two year
period for those who choose to become self-employed, compared with those who instead
remain employees.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table A1 show the means for the two sub-samples when neither
group is self-employed (year t-2).80 There are some systematic initial diﬀerences between
these two groups. Those who will enter self-employment in the following year (year t-
1) report property taxdeductions, interest income, and dividend income 43%, 65%, and
21% of the time, respectively. The same ﬁgures for those who will remain employees
are 27%, 49.7%, and 12%. To account for these initial systematic diﬀerences, we weight
observations in the control group to match the average observable characteristics of those
who will become self-employed.81 The third column in Table A1 shows the means for the
weighted sample of employees, and the fourth column demonstrates that our treatment
and weighted control groups are now very similar in the initial year.
The next two columns measure the changes in each of the proposed independent vari-
ables between the ﬁrst and the third year in the two (weighted) subsamples, and the
ﬁnal column shows the diﬀerence in changes across the two groups. If the changes in the
two subsamples are statistically indistinguishable, then the proposed independent variable
would appear to be a valid instrument for underlying earnings ability, e.g. it is uncorre-
lated with omitted factors aﬀecting the self-employment decision. In fact, other than the
obvious and expected deviation in the path of wage and salary income, the only signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across the two groups are relative increases in the likelihood that those who en-
ter self-employment report interest income and ﬁle jointly. While statistically signiﬁcant,
the increase in interest income reporting represents only a 5.7% change from the baseline
rate, and should not introduce an important bias.
80 These analyses are unweighted because only the cross-sectional weights are provided and these are no
longer nationally representative given the over-sampling of higher income individuals.
81 We ﬁrst run a probit to predict the likelihood individuals will enter self-employment given the proposed
instruments, along with a dummy variable for having positive wages and ln(wages if positive). If the
estimated probability of someone being self-employed is Pi, then the weight on each initial observation for
someone who does not later become self-employed is Pi/(1 − Pi), while the weight is 1 on an observation
where the individual does subsequently become self-employed.
38In Table A2, we repeat this analysis for transitions into self-employment with losses
only, since this is our dependent variable of interest. For these transitions, the probabilities
of reporting mortgage and property taxdeductions, e.g. the probability of itemizing,
changed diﬀerently over time for those who became self-employed, compared with those
who did not. This probability dropped by about eight percentage points. Presumably, the
drop in income when an individual ﬁrst becomes self-employed means a drop in itemized
deductions for state income and sales taxpayments, leading some to shift instead to a
standard deduction. Conditional on whether or not the individual itemizes, however, the
size of the deductions remained statistically unaﬀected by the self-employment decision.
Because this does not represent a particularly great change and itemization status provides
valuable information about expected earnings, we decided to use the full list of proposed
instruments. This might generate a slight systematic underestimate of the ability of the
self-employed.82
We then apply this forecasting equation to our cross-sectional sample of non-joint tax-
ﬁlers, forecasting ln(wage and salary earnings) using the above instruments for the set of
individuals who appear to be full-time employees, e.g. no single component of business
income exceeds 10% of wages in absolute value.83 The estimation is done separately for
each year for those in each of ﬁve groups: a) non-itemizers with no non-zero values for
the continuous variables b) non-itemizers with either non-zero interest or dividend income
c) itemizers with no non-zero values for the continuous variables d) itemizers with either
non-zero interest or dividend income but no non-zero property or mortgage deductions e)
itemizers with non-zero property or mortgage deductions. This regression yields a forecast
for wage and salary income ( ˆ wit), based on the instrument set.84 This forecast of expected
earnings potential is used to assign all individuals to ability quantiles.
82 In particular, individuals become self-employed in part based on unobserved factors determining earn-
ings ability. When some stop itemizing, their shift increases the average unobserved ability among both
the self-employed who do not itemize and also among those that do still itemize. Using data from the
not-self-employed, we therefore underestimate the average unobserved ability for both groups.
83 All of our cross-sectional estimations incorporate the sample weights provided.
84 We should note, however, that the sample of employed individuals used in the estimation is subject to
a selection bias, since the self-employed are dropped from the sample. The fraction of the overall sample
who become self-employed is very small, however, so that this bias should be trivial.
39In order to calculate average taxincentives across ability quantiles that reﬂect the
full distribution of possible earnings, we also need a forecast of earnings that preserves
the observed degree of cross-sectional variation. For this, we assume that the residual is
distributed normally, with the standard deviation as calculated for the individuals in each
group. Each self-employed individual is then assigned a realization of earnings potential
(ˆ wit(1 + ˜ ηit)) based on a random draw from the appropriate distribution. Observed wage
and salary earnings are used for individuals who are not self-employed.
Also needed in calculating taxrates are parallel predictions for AGI and tax able income
in the absence of self-employment.85 We use the same set of independent variables and
groupings to forecast each individual’s ln(AGIit):
ln(AGIit)=Xitγt + ˜ ψit,
where ˜ ψit and the error from the regression of log wages are assumed to be joint normally
distributed. Individuals are assigned a value for AGI based on the draw for the log wage
residual and a draw from the conditional distribution of the log AGI residual. As before,
we use observed AGI for individuals who are not self-employed.
Finally, to forecast taxable income, we rely on our assumption that the itemization
status of the individual is unaﬀected by the self-employment decision. For those who do
not itemize, we can calculate taxable income from AGI using the standard deduction and
information about the number of exemptions. If individuals do itemize, then we estimate
the ratio of taxable income to AGI as a function of the same basic set of instruments,
with the continuous variables deﬁned as shares of AGI, as well as a four-part spline in AGI
divided by the maximum amount in each bracket. As before, these regressions were done
separately on the ﬁve diﬀerent groups, depending on what information was available. We
again assume that the residual is normally distributed to assign self-employed individuals
speciﬁc realizations.86
85 Under the provisions imposing a maximum tax rate on earned income and providing an earned-income-
tax credit, the formulae required information about AGI.
86 If the resulting draw of the residual implied itemized deductions smaller than the standard deduction,
then the standard deduction was used.
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Notes: In this example, the taxpayer is assumed to have total expected income of $150,000, with $120,000 in wage and salary earnings and $30,000 in 
business income.  The solid line shows how after-tax income varies for different realizations of business income when that business income is noncorporate.  
The dashed line shows how after-tax income varies when business income is corporate.  The relationship between pre-tax and after-tax income is calculated 
based on the 1993 personal income tax, payroll tax, and corporate tax schedules.  Here, we calculate effective payroll and capital gains taxes using the 
methods described in the text.  The benefit to incorporation is set to 0.12, consistent with the empirical results.  44
 























































Notes: Taxpayers are assigned to one of six ability quantiles based on relative predicted earnings in each year.  Individuals are classified as having active 
noncorporate losses if the absolute value of sole propietorship, partnership, or S-corporation losses exceeds 10% of wage and salary income.  45
 












































Notes: Taxpayers are assigned to one of six ability quantiles based on relative predicted earnings in each year.  The "income shifting" incentive is calculated 
under our baseline assumptions: i) risk neutrality, ii) no nontax benefits to incorporation, iii) the coefficient of variation of business income is equal to 2, iv) 
the effective corporate rate is equal to the minimum corporate rate, and v) the effective capital gains rate is .25gt.  46
 










































Notes: Taxpayers are assigned to one of six ability quantiles based on relative predicted earnings in each year.  The "subsidy to risk" incentive is calculated 
under our baseline assumptions: i) risk neutrality, ii) no nontax benefits to incorporation, iii) the coefficient of variation of business income is equal to 2, iv) 
the effective corporate rate is equal to the minimum corporate rate, and v) the effective capital gains rate is equal to .25gt.  47
 

















































Notes:  The solid line depicts aggregate rates of "active" noncorporate losses predicted from our baseline specification in the first row in Table 2.  The dashed 
line  shows predicted rates when the two tax terms are set to zero.  The aggregate rate is calculated by weighting the predicted rate for each quantile by that 
quantile's share of total predicted earnings in that year.  48
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Notes: Each row corresponds to a separate regression of the dependent variable indicated on the tax measures, as well as shares and indicators for ability 
quantiles and year indicators.  The assumptions used in the calculation of the tax incentives measures are indicated in each row.  All share the assumption of risk 
neutrality and zero non-tax benefits (or costs) to incorporation.  The sum of squared residuals (SSR) is divided by the degrees of freedom to account for the fact 
that some specifications include different numbers of regressors (brackets highlight cases where the dependent variable has changed).  Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  The number of observations is 132.  
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.  
* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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0.0449  θ =0.12  β =50 
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the log-odds ratio for the active rate of self-employment losses.  Each row corresponds to a distinct method 
used to calculate the tax incentive measures, with the characteristics of that method as indicated.  For all of these cases, we assume that the coefficient of 
variation for business income is 2, the effective corporate rate is the minimum rate, and that the effective capital gains rate is as described in the text.  A selection 
term, equal to the log of the percent of individuals with active losses predicted to be observed as such in our noncorporate data, is included in the specifications 
with a positive non-tax benefit to incorporation.  The sum of squared residuals (SSR) is divided by the degrees of freedom to account for the fact that some 
specifications include different numbers of regressors.  All regressions include shares and indicators for ability quantiles and year indicators, as well as the 
incentive measures shown.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The number of observations is 132.  
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.  
* 
Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 3a: Forecasted rates of entrepreneurship in 1993;  baseline specification 
  Ability quantile 
Tax  parameters  [0,70]  (70,80] (80,90] (90,95] (95,99]  (99,100]  Aggregate 
Under  1993  tax  law  0.009 0.021 0.018 0.024 0.037 0.113 0.020 
Minimum  corporate  rate  reduced  to  10%  0.019 0.047 0.040 0.055 0.082 0.234 0.043 
Personal income tax rates reduced by 5 
percentage points  0.008 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.073 0.014 
20%  flat  tax  0.010 0.028 0.026 0.034 0.045 0.093 0.023 
2001  personal  income  tax  reforms  0.008 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.029 0.082 0.016 
Negative  income  tax  0.028 0.046 0.039 0.052 0.071 0.205 0.045 
Notes: The rates in each panel are forecasted based on the estimation results from our baseline specification (row 1 in Table 2).  Each column shows the 
predicted rate of active self-employment losses for the ability quantile indicated.  To calculate the aggregate rate shown in the final column, we weight the rate 
for each quantile by its share of overall predicted earnings.  In the first row, the two tax incentive measures are calculated using the actual tax schedules for 1993.  
The following rows are calculated under specific adjustments to the 1993 tax code.  Under the 20% flat tax, both personal and corporate rates have been reduced 
to a single 20% rate and the EITC and capital gains taxes have been eliminated.  Under the negative income tax, negative personal income generates a rebate 
based on the minimum marginal tax rate.   51
Table 3b: Forecasted rates of entrepreneurship in 1993; specification with nontax benefits to incorporation 
  Ability quantile 
Tax  parameters  [0,70]  (70,80] (80,90] (90,95] (95,99]  (99,100]  Aggregate 
Under  1993  tax  law  0.016 0.026 0.021 0.024 0.038 0.116 0.025 
Minimum  corporate  rate  reduced  to  10%  0.033 0.057 0.045 0.058 0.083 0.232 0.052 
Personal income tax rates reduced by 5 
percentage points  0.015 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.028 0.081 0.020 
20%  flat  tax  0.017 0.034 0.029 0.036 0.046 0.094 0.028 
2001  personal  income  tax  reforms  0.015 0.023 0.018 0.023 0.031 0.088 0.021 
Negative  income  tax  0.021 0.032 0.025 0.032 0.045 0.137 0.030 
Notes: The rates in each panel are forecasted based on the estimation results from the specification with θ =0.12 and β =0 (row 3 in Table 2).  We ignore the 
selection term when predicting loss rates, so that the rate includes individuals who would choose to report active losses as corporate income.  Each column shows 
the predicted rate of active self-employment losses for the ability quantile indicated.  To calculate the aggregate rate shown in the final column, we weight the 
rate for each quantile by its share of overall predicted earnings.  In the first row, the two tax incentive measures are calculated using the actual tax schedules for 
1993.  The following rows are calculated under specific adjustments to the 1993 tax code.  Under the 20% flat tax, both personal and corporate rates have been 
reduced to a single 20% rate and the EITC and capital gains taxes have been eliminated.  Under the negative income tax, negative personal income generates a 
rebate based on the minimum marginal tax rate.   52
Table 3c: Forecasted rates of entrepreneurship in 1993; specification with nontax benefits to incorporation and risk aversion 
  Ability quantile 
Tax  parameters  [0,70]  (70,80] (80,90] (90,95] (95,99]  (99,100]  Aggregate 
Under  1993  tax  law  0.014 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.037 0.114 0.023 
Minimum  corporate  rate  reduced  to  10%  0.008 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.023 0.071 0.014 
Personal income tax rates reduced by 5 
percentage points  0.013 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.076 0.018 
20%  flat  tax  0.039 0.090 0.073 0.088 0.114 0.213 0.068 
2001  personal  income  tax  reforms  0.013 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.029 0.085 0.019 
Negative  income  tax  0.023 0.038 0.029 0.036 0.050 0.149 0.034 
Notes: The rates in each panel are forecasted based on the estimation results from the specification with θ =0.12 and β =4 (row 5 in Table 2).   We ignore the 
selection term when predicting loss rates, so that the rate includes individuals who would choose to report active losses as corporate income.  Each column shows 
the predicted rate of active self-employment losses for the ability quantile indicated.  To calculate the aggregate rate shown in the final column, we weight the 
rate for each quantile by its share of overall predicted earnings.  In the first row, the two tax incentive measures are calculated using the actual tax schedules for 
1993.  The following rows are calculated under specific adjustments to the 1993 tax code.  Under the 20% flat tax, both personal and corporate rates have been 
reduced to a single 20% rate and the EITC and capital gains taxes have been eliminated.  Under the negative income tax, negative personal income generates a 
rebate based on the minimum marginal tax rate. 
 
   53
Table 4. Explaining secular time variation in entrepreneurship 
Dep. Var. = Year effect estimated from our baseline specification 
Independent variable  (1)  (2) 























Time Trend  −  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the estimated year effect from our baseline specification predicting 
the log-odds ratio of self-employment losses in column 1 of Table 2.  The average profit rate among large firms is 
calculated from Statistics of Income data on the amount of assets and taxable income by detailed asset size 
categories.  Firms are classified as large if assets exceed $1 million in 1993 dollars.  The average profit rate 
calculated in this way is highly correlated with the profit rate calculated based on net income (less deficit).  The 
number of observations is 21.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.  
* 
Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A1: The Impact of Transitions to Self-Employment on Components of Income 
  Mean in t-2  Difference  Change from  t-2 to t  Difference 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
































































































































































































Enters self-employment in t-1  Yes  No  No    Yes  No   
Matched "control" group    No  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  1,316  81,938  81,938  83,254  1,316  81,938  83,254 
Notes to Table A1: The sample is the sub-sample of the 1979-1990 IMF panel of taxpayers that satisfies the same set of restrictions applied to our cross-sectional 
sample.  We exclude taxpayers who: i) report age exemptions, ii) have positive retirement income, iii) are not employed or self-employed, iv) report farm income 
in excess of 10% of wages and salaries, or iv) are claimed as dependents by another taxpayer.  A taxpayer is defined as being actively self-employed if the 
absolute value of business, partnership, or sub-chapter S corporation net income is at least 10% of wage and salary earnings.  The first column presents means in 
year t-2 for taxpayers that enter active self-employment in t-1 and remain self-employed in t.  The continuous variables expressed in logarithmic form are missing   55
for non-positive values of the underlying variables.  The second column presents means for individuals who do not enter self-employment in t-1 nor in t.  The 
third column shows the means for the same sample as in column 2 re-weighted to more closely match those who enter self-employment according to observables 
in t-2 (based on an initial probit regression as described in the text).  Column 4 then shows the difference in means across the sample of those who enter self-
employment and the matched sample that does not.  Columns 4-6 show the same statistics for changes in characteristics from t-2 to t for these same two samples.  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All monetary values have been converted to 1990 dollars using the CPI for all goods.  
** indicates the difference is significant 
at the 5% level.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A2: The Impact of Transitions to Self-Employment with Losses on Components of Income 
  Mean in t-2  Difference  Change from  t-2 to t  Difference 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 

































































































































































































Enters self-employment in t-1 (with losses in t)  Yes  No  No    Yes  No   
Matched "control" group    No  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number  of  Observations  387 81,938  81,939  82,325 387 81,938  83,325 
Notes to Table A2: This table repeats the analysis described in Table A1 for individuals who enter self-employment in year t-1 and have active losses in year t.  
Individuals are classified as having active losses if net losses from business, partnership, or sub-chapter S corporation activity exceed 10% of wage and salary 
income.  The control group includes individuals who do not transition to active self-employment over the same period. 
 
 